their company. The six objectives that this small group subsequently created not only helped shape "a new kind of company," 4 but ultimately became the foundation for what came to be known as "the HP way."
These six objectives, which later became seven, are: 1. Recognize that profit is the best measure of a company's contribution to society and the ultimate source of corporate strength; 2. Continually improve the value of the products and services offered to customers; 3. Seek new opportunities for growth but focus efforts on fields in which the company can make a contribution; 4. Provide employment opportunities that include the chance to share in the company's success; 5. Maintain an organizational environment that fosters individual motivation, initiative and creativity; 6. Demonstrate good citizenship by making contributions to the community; 7. Emphasize growth as a requirement for survival. 
Carleton S. (Carly) Fiorina
Carly Fiorina, 47, graduated from Stanford University with a bachelor's degree in medieval history and philosophy. She went on to earn a master's degree in business administration from the University of Maryland at College Park, as well as a Master of Science degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Before joining HP, Fiorina spent a combined total of almost 20 years at AT&T and Lucent Technologies. At Lucent, she was instrumental in expanding the company's international business as well as in planning both its initial public offering and its later break-off from AT&T. 6 At both companies, Fiorina held a number of senior leadership positions.
When she became chairman and CEO of HP in 1999, Carly Fiorina became the first woman to lead so large a company, and consequently, one of the nation's most prominent female executives. Perhaps more important to HP's future, however, Fiorina became the first outsider to take charge of the 62-year-old company.
Changes under Fiorina
Although HP was a model company in many ways, Fiorina believed that it had become somewhat inbred and sluggish over the years. 7 After taking the helm at the Silicon Valley company, she immediately went to work revitalizing the company and kick-starting growth. As Fiorina later explained, "We set out on a process to preserve what was best about HP and reinvent the rest." 8 Fiorina traveled more than 250,000 miles during her first year, visiting HP facilities worldwide and urging employees to step up the pace. She went to work overhauling the company's structure, consolidating operating units, and shearing away layers of bureaucracy. She pushed for more focus in the lucrative area of services. She also engineered a new marketing campaign featuring a simplified "hp" logo that dropped the founders' names. Overall, Fiorina worked hard to modernize HP's culture and to achieve her vision of the company's future.
The Company Struggles
Even though stocks gradually rose to a peak of $74.48 after Fiorina was hired from their value of $54.43 the day before she had joined HP, 9 meeting growth targets proved difficult as both the company and the industry stumbled. As a result, HP was forced to cut jobs, to ask employees to take unpaid leave, and, in 2000, to scrap plans to buy the consulting arm of PricewaterhouseCoopers. By September 2001, HP's stock value had fallen to less than half of its level when Fiorina was hired. Consequently, many analysts speculated that Fiorina, who had initially won accolades both inside and outside the company, had so fallen from grace that she was in danger of losing her job. 10 
Fiorina Announces a Merger
Convinced that turning the company around required more than just strategy from within, on September 3, 2001, Carly Fiorina announced HP's plans to acquire Compaq in a stock transaction valued at $25 billion (see Exhibit A-4).
The idea for the merger with Compaq-a Houston-based PC maker founded in 1982-had grown out of a phone conversation between Fiorina and Compaq chairman and CEO Michael Capellas in late June of 2001. The original purpose of the phone conversation between the two CEOs, who had met at a policy meeting in Washington 18 months earlier, was to discuss a possible licensing agreement. However, their conversation led to a discussion of competitive strategy and the idea of a merger between the two companies was broached. By July the basics of the deal had already been hammered out, and by the first week of September, the merger had been approved by the boards at both companies.
EXHIBIT 1
T r a n s a c t i o n S u m m a r y The Merger Meets with Opposition
As both HP and Compaq had been hurt by price wars in the computer industry, the merger seemed-at least to Fiorina and Capellas-the perfect way for the new company to differentiate itself and to become more competitive. However, the merger was initially met with skepticism by investors and employees of the two companies, causing stock prices for HP and Compaq to fall significantly in the months following the deal's announcement.
Critics of the merger cited a long list of problems with the deal. Some opponents of the deal believed that rather than accelerating growth, merging the two companies would simply create a bigger company with bigger problems. As one analyst explained, "This is not a case of 1 + 1 = 2. More like 1 + 1 = 1.5."
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Other opponents believed that competitors would try to swoop in and get solution providers and customers to switch allegiances and product lines. Some wondered how HP would hold onto loyal Compaq customers if the Compaq logo were to completely disappear. Still others worried about the difficulty of blending the two large organizations and their workers.
Fiorina Justifies the Merger
Even with the poor reception of the merger from Wall Street and industry analysts, Fiorina did not back down. She argued that the merger would eliminate one player in an oversupplied PC marketplace. It would also improve HP's market share across the hardware line and double the size of HP's service unit-both essential steps in being able to compete with industry-giant IBM. In addition, Fiorina argued, the merger would create a full-service technology firm capable of doing everything from selling PCs and printers to setting up complex networks. The merger would eliminate redundant product groups and costs in marketing, advertising, and shipping, while at the same time preserving much of the two companies' revenues.
To critics who questioned HP's motives for the deal, Fiorina emphasized that the chief driver for the HP-Compaq merger was competitive positioning. To those who questioned the chances that the merger would succeed, Fiorina pointed out that the distinguishing characteristic of successful mergers is the focus on consolidation, not diversification-exactly what HP planned to do after its merger with Compaq. To skeptics who resisted change to "The HP Way," Fiorina countered, "The HP Way has always been about change. It's always been about innovation, it's always been about bold moves." 12 Although she recognized that the HP Way had become something of a "gentle bureaucracy of entitlement and consensus," 13 Fiorina emphasized that the important values of HP's culture (i.e., creativity, change, and innovation) were the very values that justified the merger. Plans for the New HP 
Stopping the Deal
Despite the cold reception of the deal by many investors and analysts, once approved by the boards at both HP and Compaq, the merger could be stopped from going through in only a handful of ways. The deal could be terminated if the companies mutually agreed to cancel it, if either company experienced a material adverse change, or if regulators rejected it. In addition, either company could decide to break up the deal; however, it would have to pay the other company a $675 million termination fee to do so.
14 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as a stock transaction, the deal could be terminated if shareholders of either company rejected it.
Walter Hewlett's Vote as an HP Board Member
Walter Hewlett, the 58-year-old son of one of the late co-founders, is a software developer who also teaches music at Stanford University. In addition, Hewlett is a trustee of the William R. Hewlett Revocable Trust, chairman of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and a board member at HP.
On September 3, 2001 , Walter Hewlett voted with the rest of HP's board to O.K. the proposed merger. In the months leading up to the board's vote, however, Hewlett had expressed concern about the deal and its impact on his family's charities. But just days before the vote, he learned that the merger agreement called for unanimous board approval in order to ensure the best possible shareholder reception. Believing that the board would find a way to approve the merger regardless of how he voted, Hewlett reluctantly cast his final vote in favor of the deal.
Hewlett Announces he will Oppose the Deal
Walter Hewlett's call to Carly Fiorina on the morning of November 6 left executives at HP scrambling to do damage control. As stockholder rejection was one of the few ways to terminate the deal, Hewlett's announcement-that he, along with his sisters and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, would vote their combined 5% stake against the deal-came as a heavy blow to Fiorina, Capellas, and other proponents of the merger (see Exhibit A-6).
Although the HP board had gotten Hewlett's signature, they had failed to win genuine support for the deal. According to one of Hewlett's lawyers, "When Walter voted for [the deal] as a board member, I think he and everyone on the board understood that he might vote differently as a shareholder. Everyone knew his views." 15 With his name and the huge stake he and his family had as shareholders, Hewlett's disapproval of the deal posed a serious threat to the deal itself, as well as to the future of the main force behind the deal-Carly Fiorina.
Hewlett's Rationale for his Opposition
According to Walter Hewlett, Carly Fiorina had exaggerated the importance of scale in the computer business. In addition, Hewlett believed that rather than make the company more competitive, the merger would expose HP to the brutal, low-profit PC business. Although Packard emphasized that he was not speaking for other family members or for the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, his decision to oppose the merger left the deal on even shakier ground than before. With the Packard Humanities Institute opposing the deal, chances that the David and Lucile Packard Foundation would also decide to vote its 10.4% stake against the deal seemed more probable than ever.
Packard's Rationale for his Opposition
Packard, the oldest son of the other late co-founder, claimed that Fiorina's high-handed management and her efforts to reinvent the company ran counter to the company's core values as established by the founders. Citing massive layoffs as an example of this departure from HP's core values, Packard argued that although the founders never guaranteed job security, "Bill and Dave never developed a premeditated business strategy that treated HP employees as expendable." 16 
Another Reason behind the Families' Opposition
Family shareholders, who often have large holdings in the family's company, often dislike risk more than most other investors. For the families of HP founders William Hewlett and David Packer, the incentive to preserve wealth rather than to create it was especially strong, as their HP stocks finance donations to numerous worthy causes. These causes include the Packard Humanities Institute, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.
HP's Communication with the Families
Many analysts wondered why, following the merger's announcement, more effort wasn't made to reach out to the families of the founders and to make sure they backed management. According to David Packard, the first time he heard about the proposed deal between his father's company and Compaq was at the end of Labor Day Weekend when he logged onto the Internet to read the news. His first thoughts were, he later recalled, "My God. Compaq-why Compaq?" He continued, "I couldn't quite figure out why they would do this." 17 Packard indicated that he didn't think that HP had contacted his sisters to try to win their support, and at least two of Walter Hewlett's sisters said that HP didn't contact them either.
In addressing the question of why HP didn't put forth more effort to ensure the families' support for the deal, one HP spokeswoman explained that the company "treated both families the same way we treat other shareholders." 18 Rather than receiving special treatment, for example, both foundations received a standard presentation by Fiorina and HP CFO Bob Wayman in a road show for investors in the weeks following the deal's announcement. In treating its large shareholders consistently, HP justified, the company was following SEC guidelines.
Fiorina Remains Confident
After she announced the controversial deal between HP and Compaq in September, Fiorina traveled extensively around the country in an effort to win support for the merger from analysts, investors, and HP employees. On November 6, when she learned that both Walter Hewlett and David Packard would oppose the deal, Fiorina doubled her efforts and immediately went to work calling investors and planning a new round of meetings.
Even before the David and Lucile Packard Foundation had decided whether or not it would vote its 10.4% stake against the merger, Carly Fiorina expressed her confidence that the merger would succeed. "It's going to go through. It will," Fiorina said. She continued, "This company has never been about looking in the rear-view mirror." 19 In another speech, Fiorina stated, "Standing still is the path of greatest risk, because our customers and the technologies we market will not stand still with us. Standing still means losing ground. Standing still means choosing the path of retreat, not leadership." 20 Still, Carly Fiorina knew that the road to the merger's success would be long and difficult. She also knew that if the merger were to fail, her career at HP would certainly be over. So even with her seemingly unshakable confidence in the deal, as Carly Fiorina drove home from HP headquarters on November 6, she surely couldn't help but wonder, "Can we still pull this off?" 
Discussion

